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WHY NOT APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CIVIL
CASES? THE SWISS APPROACH
FRANcis WILLIAm O'BRIEN*
The author points out that the Swiss Constitution, unlike its Ameri-
can counterpart, guarantees the right to counsel in civil but not
criminal cases. His analysis of the Swiss approach challenges basic
assumptions underlying recent Supreme Court cases like Miranda
v. Arizona. It also suggests lines of future development in the Ameri-
can concept of the right to counsel.
Americans often brag that no matter how guilty a man may be,
the courts of the United States are scrupulous in guaranteeing him
all his constitutional rights.
This is a brave boast but not an empty one. The Supreme Court
has recently ruled that even a suspect has a right to a state-paid lawyer
in every step of a case, even before police pose a single query.' This,
argue the Justices, is the only practical method of assuring that the
arrested person will not be deprived of rights embedded in the Con-
stitution.
There is, however, no such requirement in civil cases, that is, in
suits between private persons where no crime whatsoever has been
committed. One may thus properly ask if the Court's solicitude is not
misplaced. In so far as civil cases are concerned, is not the Court say-
ing in effect, no matter how innocent a man may be it's not our concern
whether he needs counsel to receive justice?
No LAWYER AT TimE OF AREST
At least one other well-known democracy has given thought to
the problem herein posed and has come up with an entirely different
solution from that provided in America. Before speaking of this solu-
tion, however, a word should first be said about certain aspects of its
criminal law.
* Visiting Professor, State University of Lausanne, Switzerland.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 380 US. (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 206 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
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In Switzerland an arrested suspect is never allowed to consult a
lawyer prior to the preliminary questioning by the police. In most
instances, depending upon state law,2 he may consult one after a magis-
trate has decided that there are sufficient grounds for locking him up3
An arrested person has a right to be heard by a magistrate usually
within 24 hours, although the period in some cantons (states) is 48
hours or even three days.'
Investigation begins immediately.5 It is at this point that the
suspect may ask for appointed counsel,' but his request will generally
be honored only if circumstances or the importance of the case demands
it.7 Generally, a person held in "preventive detention" may consult
with his lawyer, s but in certain cases where secrecy is of the outmost
importance this may be forbidden. Such would be the case if police
were rounding up other members of the gang or searching for addi-
tional evidence. An untimely warning from the jailed suspect through
intermediaries might easily lead to the destruction of the evidence or
the flight of his accomplices. Hence the investigating magistrate--e
juge instructeur or d'instruction--is permitted to pull a veil of secrecy
over some criminal prosecutions and keep it there for several days.
During the period of investigation, which may last for weeks, the
interrogation of the suspect is naturally the most important function
of the judge. Procedures vary in the different cantons, but generally
2 Since Switzerland is a federal state, there is a different procedure for each of the
twenty-five cantons (states) plus that for the national government. Hence, the references
below will generally be to provisions which seem fairly representative. But since 1942
Switzerland has had only one penal code for the whole country which defines crimes and
specifies penalties. It is applied by each canton following its own procedure.
3 This right seems to be general, but it can be restricted, as will become clear below.
4 Const. de Neuchitel, art. 7. This is the maximum.
5 The investigation is held before a juge instructeur. In practically every jurisdiction,
the recorder is the only other person present besides the accused. Infra notes 8 and 9.
8 Art. 35 of the Procedure F~drale reads: "The accused has, in every stage of the
case, the right to provide himself with counsel. The judge is to inform him of this at
the first questioning." This does not mean, however, that he has the right to have his
lawyer present whenever he is questioned. The contrary is the case almost universally in
Switzerland.
7 Art. 36 of the Procedure Fdrale lists "inexperience" or "tender age" as reasons
which may justify appointing counsel. But see infra note 16.
8 Code de Procedure PNnale de Vaud, art. 203. This provision is fairly representative
of provisions in other cantons.
9 Code de Procedure Pnale de Vaud, arts. 205, 206. Thus, for six days and possibly
longer, even the lawyer is forbidden to see the person is au secret. In the Canton of
Valaise, la mise au secret "in general ... is not to be extended beyond 14 days." Code
de Procedure Pnale du Valais, art. 73. This practice, like that in France, is often criti-
cized by lawyers in Switzerland.
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speaking, the investigating judge and a stenographer are the only per-
sons present during the questioning of suspect or witnesses. Article 118
of the Code of Federal Procedure says that the juge d'instruction "may
permit" the suspect's lawyer to be present if he thinks it compatible
with an orderly enquiry. But the cantons are absolutely free in the
matter.10 Only in Geneva is such a right extended to defense counsel.11
Article 41 of the Federal Procedure forbids the investigating judge
from using "any force, threat, promise, any false information, or any
captious question," especially "as a means for producing a confession."
Many of the cantons place the same injunction upon their investigating
officials.' But with only a stenographer present, it would be difficult
to prove a violation. And even if a confession were obtained by a for-
bidden means, it would never be excluded as evidence during the trial,
unless the avowal itself was suspect as being not true.
Once the investigation has been completed and the ciambre
d'accusation composed usually of three judges without a jury has
returned an indictment, the accused may then freely consult his lawyer,
even in cantons where such is denied during the investigation. But
state-paid counsel need be provided only for serious crimes or if the
person cannot defend himself because of his youth, his inexperience
or for other reasons.' 3 In some instances, however, a lawyer is obliga-
tory even against the wishes of the accused. 4
RIGHTS OF AcCUSED
In contrast to the American Constitution, the federal Constitution
of Switzerland mentions practically no procedural guarantees in crim-
inal cases. Article 112 provides for a trial by jury in a very limited
number of federal crimes. Article 58, which binds the cantons as well
10 By contrast, art. 112 of Vaud's procedure explicitly denies this right. In Fri-
bourg, the lawyer may communicate with the accused "from the moment of the conclusion
of the investigation." Code de Procedure P~nale de Fribourg, art. 22, para 2. In other
words, a person held in jail has no right to consult a lawyer at any time during the
days or weeks when he is being questioned. In other cantons, he can consult a lawyer
to prepare himself for interrogation and to decide upon a line of defense at the trial, but
he is on his own before the interrogating official.
11 Code de Procddure Pnale de Gen~ve, arts. 64, 69. Geneva's liberal approach
dates from 1849. See Loi du Canton de Gen~ve de 23 avril 1849, art. 10.
12 See for instance, Const. de Fribourg, art. 6 which referring to an arrested person
says, "Toute rigueur inutile ...et tout moyen de violence pour obtenir son aveu sont
interdits." See also Code de Procedure Pnale du Valais, art. 62.
13 But see infra note 19 and supra notes 7 and S. Likewise see Code de Procidure
P~nale du Valais, art. 49, Par. 3, for provisions that are similar to those in most cantonal
codes.
14 Prodadure F~darae, art. 36, par. 3.
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as the federal government, reads: "No one may be deprived of his
lawful judge. Consequently, no extraordinary judicial tribunals may
be set up." Practically no other guarantee is mentioned.
Even the constitutions of many cantons, where most crimes are
tried, are surprisingly silent on the matter of penal procedures. 15
"Immediate interrogation" by a judge after arrest-generally within
24 hours, but some places longer-is a guarantee found in only ten
of the 25 cantonal constitutions. The use of force to produce a con-
fession finds a constitutional ban in eight constitutions. Article 6 of
the Constitution of Fribourg, for instance, reads: "All unnecessary
severity at the time of arrest and throughout detention of an indi-
vidual, and any form of violence to obtain his confession are pro-
hibited."
As for the right to counsel, only six constitutions make reference
to such a guarantee.' However, the right to be defended by a lawyer
is written into the Code of Penal Procedure of practically every canton.
Even state-paid attorneys are provided in certain cases, as noted above.
But in no case is this guarantee as ample as that now demanded in
the United States by reason of recent Supreme Court rulings.'7
RIGHTS OF THE INNOCENT
Before rushing to the conclusion that the Swiss are less concerned
about an individual's rights in judicial proceedings, one must pause
and give thought to the practice in a civil case. In such a case, one
private person sues another private person for a private wrong. A man
carelessly allows his garden hose to run all night and the water ruins
a valuable painting in a neighbor's basement. No crime has been com-
mitted, no law broken; but the fact of negligence is sufficient grounds
for bringing a damage suit in court. A divorce is another example of
a civil action for which a state court provides the forum. Again, no
crime is involved: according to different state laws, adultery, mental
15 For an excellent canvas of the cantonal constitutions in this area, see Clerc,
"Etat de droit et procedure ptnale dans les constitutions cantonales," Strafprozess Und
Rechtstaat (1956). The guarantees, however, are found in the codes of penal procedure.
16 Nor does the Swiss federal constitution mention this right. By contrast, the
sixth amendment of the American constitution contains such a guarantee "in all criminal
prosecutions," originally only in federal cases, now even in state criminal cases.
17 As explained above, a lawyer is appointed for an indigent in every felony-criminal
case in America, not only during the trial but even at the moment when the police begin
to question him. Supra note 1. In Switzerland no arrested person is so privileged at this
preliminary stage. State appointed counsel is provided in most cantons only if drcum-
stances call for such. Moreover, except in Geneva, all questioning prior to the trial takes
place without allowing a lawyer to be present.
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cruelty, or mere incompatibility will provide grounds for the desired
legal remedy.
There is no law in America and no mandate from the courts which
demands that the state provide a lawyer for the parties in civil cases
even if the parties themselves cannot afford one. It is quite the contrary
in Switzerland. Article 4 of the Swiss Constitution reads that "all Swiss
are equal before the law." In elaborating upon this principle, the
Supreme Court--e Tribunal f&diral-has ruled that it guarantees the
basic right to all "to be heard in court," and, that, to make this right
meaningful, the cantons must provide a lawyer in civil cases, though
not necessarily in criminal ones.'
The words of the Swiss Court in the leading case, decided in 1937
are as follows:
The principle of 6galit before the law does not impose upon the
cantons the obligation to provide a lawyer except in those cases
where, lacking one, a party could not normally assert his rights in
proceedings. Thus free judicial assistance ought to be granted lib-
erally in a civil matter where the handling of the trial demands
knowledge of the law; it is otherwise in a penal affaire, where the
enquiry is carried out officially. Cantonal legislation may prescribe
that a lawyer will be provided an accused only in serious cases...,
[such as] where the penalty anticipated is a rather long deprivation
of liberty.19
It will be interesting to explore more deeply into the Court's
reasoning. In a Swiss criminal trial, the judge participates much more
actively than does his American counterpart.20 During the preliminary
investigations and hearings, the juge d'instruction is in complete
charge.21 According to the inquisitorial system-in America the accu-
satorial system prevails-he assumes the position of a neutral investi-
gator actively inquiring into what actually took place. He not only
hears the testimony of complainants but he personally seeks out evi-
dence and witnesses that could exonerate the accused. If doctors, psy-
18 Schefer-Heer contre Conseil d'Etat d'Appenzell Rhodes-Ext~ieures, 8 Oct. 1937,
Arr~ts du Tribunal Fdtral, 63, I, 209.
19 Ibid. In actual practice most of the cantons go far beyond this requirement of
the Court as well as the limited demands of their own laws. Even in minor cases, nearly
every indigent person will be granted counsel if he desires.
20 The same is true of the French trials and in every continental country where the
inquisitorial system prevails. See Graven, "Les droits de l'accus6 dans le procds p6nal,"
71 Rev. de Procedure PMnale 126 (1956).
21 For an example of the amplitude of his powers, see Code de Procidure Pnale du
Valais, art. 61-113. What one expert has written about the French juge d'iustrudion
might be applicable in Switzerland. "No one has power comparable to his." Graven,
"Les droits de l'accus6 dans le procla pbnal," 71 Rev. de Proc~dure Pnale 126 (1956).
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chiatrists, or other experts are needed, it is he not the defense counsel
who is obliged to make the summons.
During the actual trial, the president of the court,22 who heads a
panel generally of three or five judges, is equally active. The lawyers
play relatively minor roles. It is the presiding judge who arranges for
the calling of witnesses and experts and decides on the order of their
appearance. 23 This prevents either side from turning the trial into a
piece de tkdtre by presenting surprise star witnesses and scheduling
their appearances so as to produce the desired dramatic effect upon the
jury.
It is also the judge who poses the majority of questions. Even the
lawyers present most of their queries through the judge as interme-
diary.24 This practically eliminates cross-questioning and with it the
badgering of witnesses. Perhaps lawyers are thus obliged to sacrifice
a valuable weapon for testing the truth of a witness' story. On the other
hand, one is relieved to observe that the witnesses and the accused
are permitted to tell their tales at length without constant interruptions
and harrassments and without being bludgeoned to register statements
practically against their will as a result of the persistent hammering
of a lawyer.
The basic principle governing a federal case, found in Article 146
of Procddure Fidrale reads: "The president and the court are obli-
gated to see that the truth is brought out by all legal means." Article
157 allows the president to demand new evidence at any time.
Article 241 of the Code de Procedure Pinale de Genave lays this
injunction upon the presiding judge:
The President is invested with a discretionary power in virtue of
which he may take any measure which he believes useful for dis-
covering the truth. The law obliges his honor and his conscience to
employ every effort to promote its disclosure.
Article 242 is more specific, allowing him power to order the
appearance of new witnesses and the introduction of all additional
22 Rarely is he the same person as the juge d'instruction.
28 For instance, art. 323 of Code de Procidure P6nale de Vaud reads: "The presi-
dent questions, in the order which to him appears proper, the plaintiff, the civil party,
the witnesses and the experts.' Likewise art. 130, Code de Procedure Pnae du Valais.
24 Art. 131, par. 1, Code de Procedure P6nale du Valais says that "the parties have
the right to put questions to witnesses and experts, through the president... The
president may authorize them to pose these questions directly."
In Geneva, the president first interrogates the witnesses after which they may be
directly questioned by the accused or his lawyer. Code de Procedure Pdnale de Genive,
art. 296. But it is the exception in Switzerland to allow such questioning without the
president's intermediation. Federal practice conforms with the generally followed pro-
cedure. Proc6dure FWdrale, art. 158, 159.
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evidence which he thinks necessary. Thus, he is by no means circum-
scribed by what the lawyers present in court.
The above is sufficient to explain what the Swiss Supreme Court
meant when it stated that in a criminal case the process moves along
automatically, a proper investigation is assured, and the procedural
rights of the accused are guaranteed even when he has no lawyer.
Quite the contrary in a civil case. Nothing moves unless the parties
initiate action and then nourish the motion by their own persistent
intervention. There is no juge d'instruction to do the probings, to call
witnesses, to gather evidence, and to see that the full story is laid
before the Court. Moreover, since rules of civil procedure are fre-
quently complicated, a layman may be incapable of ever moving his
case before the proper tribunal, let alone exploiting all his procedural
privileges during the trial. Thus without a lawyer, his legal and con-
stitutional right to a civil trial may be no more significant than a mag-
nificent bequest in the will of a pauper.
THE CANTONS PROVIDE
In accordance with the high Court's interpretation of the federal
constitution, all the cantons provide state paid lawyeis in civil cases.
Since the ruling of the tribunal was in very general terms, the cantons
have a fairly large measure of liberty in drawing up laws to implement
it. That of Vaud, however, probably contains features fairly common
to all.
In this canton,25 requests for a state-paid lawyer are filed with
the Bureau de l'Assistance Judiciaire Gratuite composed of four mem-
bers: the Head of the Department of Justice and Police; a judge of
the state court; the attorney-general or one of his assistants; and a
lawyer designated by the Order of Advocates.
This panel bases its decision on answers to three questions:26 (1)
Is the petitioner too poor to engage a lawyer at his own expense?
(2) Are his claims so poorly founded that he has no hope of a favor-
able court decision? (3) Is it clear that the lawsuit would not be
engaged in by a "reasonable" litigant at his own expense?
The one requesting aid must, accordingly, furnish information
on his financial status as well as material or documents to prove that
his case is well grounded. The Bureau in giving its answers to questions
two and three fulfills at no expense a most useful service for a pros-
pective litigant. If it responds negatively on the merits of the case,
the petitioner may, of course, undertake the lawsuit personally or with
25 Loi sur L'assistance Judidaire Gratuite en Mati~re Civil, 2 dc. 1947, arts. 4, S.
26 Id., art. 6.
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a lawyer engaged at his own expense. But a prudent person would
probably decide to abandon his case, thus saving himself a risky
gamble of money, time, and effort. One wonders why all people con-
templating legal action do not first request free judicial aid simply to
elicit this valuable gratuitous advice from a panel of legal experts. If
a lawyer were consulted for this purpose, he would not only charge
but might well encourage a hopeless case should it promise some
financial returns to him personally.
The panel also performs an appreciated service for judges whose
dockets might be heavily overloaded. If vexatious clients can be dis-
suaded from bringing their fantastic claims to courts for settlement,
the tribunals will have time for cases that really merit judicial con-
sideration.
The guiding principle for such panels has been articulated by the
Supreme Court as follows:27 they may not conclude that a cause is
doomed to fail "unless the clear wording of the law or the constant
precedent of the federal Tribunal leads them to such certitude or unless
they are honestly in a position to determine that no one could hold an
opinion other than their own." Their judgment has been challenged
and sometimes reversed by the Supreme Court.2
8
The legal aid allotted includes lawyer's fees, witnesses' expenses,
funds for inspections of property involved in the suit, and funds for
the hiring of specialists called in for consultation2 9 Lawyers appointed
for any case are always assured some remuneration. This is, indeed,
essential because members of the bar are quite frequently called to aid
indigents according to a rotation system which makes service obliga-
27 Schweiz contre Basel-Stadt, 23 Jan. 1926, Arrits du Tribunal Fidral, 52, I,
105; Erbem Prochorow contre Obergericht Zurich, 26 Oct. 1929, Arrits du Tribunal
F6dral, 55, I, 291.
28 Luthi conte Dame Wehrle, 19 sept. 1946, Arrits du Tribunal Fdral, 72, II,
145 (ruling that Zurich had violated the "equality before the law" clause when in a
divorce case the state refused a free lawyer to a man on the grounds that he was not
really indigent since his wife was rich in her own right); Wfhren contre Tribunal
Supkrieur, Soleure, 9 juilet 1952, Arrfts du Tribunal FNedfral, 78, I, 193 (ruling that
the "equality" clause was violated by the state's arbitrary decision that there were no
grounds for predicting a successful outcome of a man's suit); Corbelli contre Tribunal
Cantonal de Soleure, 4 f~v. 1959, Arr~ts du Tribunal Fdral, 85, I, 192 (ordering a review
of the evidence for indigency).
29 This is the universal practice in Switzerland. Moreover, if the state appoints an
attorney, he is generally forbidden by law from receiving any other stipend than that
provided by the state. See supra note 25, art. 8, 15, for the law of one canton. Lawyers
who accept supplementary fees or who refuse to act as a court appointed counsel are
liable to disciplinary punishment. See, e.g., Code de Procedure P~nale de Fribourg (6d.
annoie, 1945), art. 22.
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tory. Some cantons are less generous than others and often lawyers'
stipends hardly cover expenses. But even so, the system would seem
to place a considerable financial burden upon the state. It should be
noted, however, that in many cases the state merely advances funds
for legal expenses which are recoverable from the losing party. If the
latter is indigent, the lawyer would, of course, not be required to wait
upon a possible amelioration of his financial condition, and so the state
provides immediate remuneration.
The Swiss system goes far towards guaranteeing meaningful
"equality before the law" in civil cases. The indigent is, of course, not
made perfectly equal to his more affluent adversary. The latter is able
to choose freely from among the most talented of the bar. The indigent
not being allowed this right, may discover that the rotation system has
turned up for him a lawyer with quite limited legal competency. But
it is difficult to conceive of any system that could level every possible
inequality. To allow every client freedom of choice would result in a
great injustice to the superior lawyers in each canton who, over-
whelmed by court appointments, might be forced virtually to renounce
their own private practice.
SWISS AND A ERIcAN EQUALITY
In America there are legal aid programs sponsored by private
groups that perform similar functions. Moreover many lawyers are
happy to take civil cases upon a contingent fee, assuring them of a
whopping 33 percent of the amount awarded by the court.30 But if a
particular litigant cannot so arrange, he has no right to state aid. No
government in America furnishes a lawyer free of charge in a civil case.
This is strange. The American Constitution has an "equality be-
fore the law" clause almost identical to the Swiss "equality" provision
which, according to the Swiss Supreme Court, imposes a constitutional
obligation upon the cantons to extend such aid.
The American Constitution also forbids the taking of property
"without due process of law." Yet procedure is so technical in civil
cases, that many litigants, pleading without counsel, could never
guarantee for themselves all the process legally due them. The result
is usually a poorly presented case-perhaps so poorly that the court
judgment is against them; thus property is indeed taken "without due
process of law." In addition, if the other party can afford counsel, or
is a lawyer himself, the contest may be so unfair that the "equal pro-
tection of the law" clause is put to visible torture.
30 In Switzerland such a practice is illegal and fairly definite guide-lines are set down
in the law for the setting of fees. Statut et Usage de l'Ordre, Arts. 25, 26.
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In many instances, a plaintiff with an excellent case, simply for-
goes bringing a most justifiable suit merely because of legal problems
beyond his own competency to handle. For such a person the guaran-
tees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Federal Constitu-
tion-not to mention the guarantees of state constitutions--are indeed
meaningless.
Someone may retort that it is not the state but another private
person or merely unfortunate personal circumstances that might inflict
the damage. But the government cannot easily wash its hands. In the
"restricted covenant" cases of several years ago, the Supreme Court
ruled that the legal machinery of the state could not be used by private
persons to promote their brand of racial discrimination even in private
housing." This, said the Court, would virtually be a state violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
But doesn't the state also violate this clause and the due process
clause as well when a court rules against a poor person without counsel
who couldn't properly present his own case? A judge or a jury renders
a decision only upon the facts they hear in court. They may be con-
vinced that the stammering litigant probably has a good case, but if
he is so overwhelmed by a clever lawyer, they may have no choice but
to rule against him. In such a case, one party is unable to obtain due
process of law and to assert his right to be heard. He is deprived of
his day in court.
The state becomes even more involved in the injustice when the
constable appears to seize a defendant's property and to sell it in
public auction, or when state officials forcefully take away children
after an unfair divorce settlement.
The so-called neutral, hands-off policy assumed by the govern-
ment, even while its courts and functionaries are actively participating
in unjust activities like those mentioned above, is hardly consistent
with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court for criminal
cases: 32 since a suspect or an accused can assert his rights only if he
knows them, he is entitled to a state-paid counsel from the moment
of arrest until the courts have completely disposed of his case.
JUSTICE FOR JACKSON
The following fictitious case will help to underscore the points
made above. Henry Jackson, a resident of Ann Arbor, Michigan,
31 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
The Court thus reversed its own ruling set down in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 US. 323
(1926).
32 Supra note 1.
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travels to Bloomington for the Indiana-Michigan football game. After
the contest he is badly injured by a speeding motor-cycle driven by
a young Chicago business man, Earl Smith.
After nine months of hospitalization, Jackson decides to sue. He
wants no more than medical expenses plus compensation for loss of
pay for his after-school job. He scrupulously calculates the sum and
settles on a figure of 9,400 dollars. Smith could pay this out of his
own earnings over a four or five year period, but he has no liability
insurance covering accidents with the borrowed motorcycle. Thus it
would be useless to sue for any huge sum. Moreover, although Jackson
still walks with a slight limp, he is not disposed to turn this into a
legacy by demanding an astronomical figure which might be a ruinous
burden for Smith, who has just married and just launched himself into
business.
Since the suit involves such a small amount, there are no lawyers
willing to take the case upon a contingency fee, and Jackson is too
poor to hire one except on the basis that he will pay his lawyer only
if he wins. Since Smith is determined to fight the case, most lawyers
figure that the gamble is too great.
Jackson is completely ignorant of legal procedure and thus would
have the greatest of difficulties even putting the judicial machinery
into motion. The first question is where to bring the suit: Michigan,
Indiana, Illinois? A summons from the court of any of the three would
be proper. Michigan would be the most convenient place for the trial
from Jackson's standpoint, but the summons from the Michigan court
must be served within the state. Earl Smith at irregular times visits
Detroit and Ann Arbor on short business trips, and Jackson could
gamble upon his being found and served. But if he waits too long, the
statute of limitations might run out and his claim would be extin-
guished.
Indiana could be another place. Since the accident took place
there, a summons served even outside its borders would have the same
effect as one served locally. Finally, there is the possibility of Illinois,
Smith's home state.
Jackson probably will not know that he could bring his suit in a
federal court rather than in a state court if he simply added a small
sum to the amount of his claim. Suits involving more than 10,000
dollars between citizens of two states can be placed under federal
jurisdiction. There might possibly be advantages here. The jurors for
the Illinois state court would be picked from the city of Chicago, those
for the federal court from the federal district, a somewhat larger area.
Since Smith has been very active in civil rights movements, he may
19671
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have a distinct advantage if several Negroes are on the jury. This possi-
bility may suggest to Jackson that he opt for the federal court since
there the percentage of potential colored jurors would be less. Or
maybe Jackson would be better off in Indiana where the court prob-
ably would not be made a forum for race questions.
Next, in order to make a well-thought-out choice, Jackson ought
to know something about the personalities of the judges and the condi-
tions of the calendars in the different tribunals. A court may be so
behind in its work that he would have to wait years before his case
comes to trial.
Each jurisdiction uses its own procedural rules and this fact might
also be significant for Jackson. A victim in a personal injury case often
feels safer with a jury, so given a choice, he makes sure that a jury is
guaranteed by the code of civil procedure in the state he selects. Jack-
son's case is clearly entitled to trial by jury in a federal court and
probably in most state courts. It could be, however, that he would
waive this right if Chicago becomes the trial site, for reasons stated
above. But if he desires one, he must register his demand during the
pleading stage of the case. Neglect to do so constitutes a waiver, and,
unless Smith insists, the judge might try the case without a jury.
WHE E THE INNOCENT SUFFER
Most of the above choices are based on constitutional provisions,
but how many people know that they exist or are able to assert them
without a lawyer's assistance?83 In Switzerland the state is obliged,
precisely because of the complexities involved, to furnish counsel to
help an indigent litigant in these civil cases. In the United States this
obligation exists only for criminal cases. Indeed, the accused in Amer-
ica may demand that he have at his right hand his state-appointed
lawyer for any questioning from the moment of arrest until the final
disposition of his case. This is to protect him from making statements
that could lead to an admission of guilt. But there is no such solicitude
for parties in civil proceedings. And yet the chances are at least as
great that an unrepresented litigant will destroy his whole defense by
one unguarded remark. For instance, the law of contributory negli-
gence in personal injury cases is so vague and complicated that an
33 This was precisely the central point in the criminal cases cited above: the
enjoyment of constitutional rights should never be dependent upon a person's financial
condition.
In the fictitious case, Jackson, who seems to have a most justifiable case, might
easily fail to assert these rights without a lawyer, and thus possibly lose his case. But
one might imagine the injustice that could easily be done to an innocent defendant who
cannot afford a lawyer in a similar case.
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astute lawyer could easily elicit from such a person admissions that
end all hope of a favorable judgment. It should be remembered that
in civil cases parties have no privilege against taking the witness stand
as in criminal cases.
One can appreciate the repugnance felt by Americans against
sending an innocent man to prison. But why are their sensibilities so
dull when innocent people are made to suffer by unjust decisions in
civil cases? It is rare that the former injustice is perpetrated. Indeed,
the percentage is infinitesimal compared to the staggering number of
dubious rulings in divorce and personal injury cases.
Perhaps a criminal is sentenced to a year in jail, whereas, if de-
fended by a clever lawyer, he might have gotten only six months. The
public conscience twitches. But why are there no similar twitchings
when the court rules in favor of a vindictive wife against her innocent
husband who for the rest of his life must suffer the deprivation of his
children plus the payment of oppressive alimony each month? Why,
finally, are there no probings of the public conscience over the fact that
many people completely forego employing their legal and constitutional
rights to a civil trial of any kind simply because they cannot afford a
lawyer?
In Switzerland state-paid lawyers are freely provided to plaintiffs
in divorce cases and to injured parties lacking funds to initiate pro-
ceedings. The same provision applies to indigent defendants. The latter
may have particular need of such legal assistance in instances when
the plaintiff, rich in her or in his own right, comes to the court sup-
ported by a lawyer and a string of partisan witnesses. The problem is
of equal proportions in a paternity suit when a disappointed woman
turns vindictive and goes to court solely to damage the future of an
innocent man. He might well be helpless against such a designing
female and her battery of lawyers. Swiss law recognizes the situation
and provides such a person free counsel if he is indigent.
In a criminal case, the Swiss judge would already have before him
a huge dossier of information gathered by the juge d'instruction which
presents both sides 4 Thus he is not dependent on what the parties
or their lawyers tell him in court. But in a paternity or a divorce case,
or other civil affairs, he is almost completely at the mercy of lawyer
and witnesses0 5
34 All the information gathered by the investigating magistrate must be presented
in open court by the presiding judge at the trial.;
36 Note, for instance, the following rule which governs Swiss civil procedure in a
federal case. "The judge may not go beyond the conclusions of the parties, nor base his
judgment on other facts than those which have been alleged in the suit." Loi Fidirale
de Procidure Civile FRdrale (dec. 1947), art. 3.
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It should be recalled that an attorney is, of course, not pledged
to pursue blind-folded justice and to seek only the real good of the
children and of both parties. He is getting paid to promote victory on
his client's terms: 6 custody of the children and as much alimony as
the indigent defendant might ever be able to sustain. In the course of
his investigations, he may discover that the wife is a tramp and that
the husband is an honorable man. But it would represent extra-
ordinary self-immolation for the lawyer to drop the case or to inform
the judge that it would be harmful to let the children stay with his
client!
Quite the contrary in a criminal proceeding. The judge himself
is already well acquainted with all parties and thus he is a knowledge-
able public defender for an accused person who may not be represented
by counsel. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney, unlike the lawyer in
a civil case, is not getting paid to persuade judge or jury to return a
verdict against every defendant. Neither he nor the judge is interested
in seeing the innocent punished. If in the course of the trial he comes
in-possession of evidence exonerating the accused, surely he will reveal
this to the judge and ask that charges be dropped.
BETTER THE NI=
In justification of the large number of safeguards granted to
accused persons, Americans frequently utter such statements as "better
to let nine guilty men go free than to condemn one innocent man."
Such a remark is only a rhetorical way of saying that "we are very
careful not to punish the innocent." All civilized governments profess
and practice like solicitude. But if the statement is taken to mean
anything more, then it is rather foolish and quite unfair-much like
the question "when are you going to stop beating your wife?" It seems
to offer only two alternatives. But it would be the most inefficient judi-
cial system imaginable which had to release 90 percent of all criminals
to make sure that no innocent person is punishedl
As a matter of fact, it is not necessary to accept either of the
painful alternatives. It would be much wiser to dispense with the
unfortunate piece of rhetoric and to say simply and candidly, as all
enlightened nations do, that we are very careful not to punish the
innocent and equally careful not to let the guilty go free.
Expounders of the "nine go free" doctrine completely forget
another important factor. In nearly every criminal case there is at
least one innocent person who has suffered unjust harm at the hands
36 In Switzerland where the "contingency fee" practice does not prevail, a state-
appointed lawyer would feel much less restricted for he is paid regardless of the decision.
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of the malefactor. It may be a widow, a mother, or a large family
whose bread-winner has been murdered or incapacitated by a criminal's
revolver. These parties have a clear right to financial compensation
from the aggressor for their great loss. How pitiless to tell 90 percent
of such victims that nothing can be done for them!
In Switzerland, as well as in France, the rights of the victim
vis-a-vis those of the accused are sharply focused when the former
becomes a civil party in a criminal trial. This is the usual practice:
if one and the same act gives rise to both civil and criminal liability,
the injured party asserts his claim in the criminal prosecution.17 If the
court finds the accused guilty, it also settles the claims for damages.
This not only saves time and money, but it also takes from the victim
the great burden of personally initiating a separate civil action, as
procedure in the United States demands.
If the crime were serious, the defendant would be entitled to a
lawyer, and a state-provided one if he were indigent. The injured party
can assert his claims personally; rarely would the state provide him
a lawyer, since his rights will probably be sufficiently protected by the
court, especially by the prosecuting attorney2 8 However, some laws
state equivalently that if the defendant has a lawyer, 9 this can be a
reason for appointing counsel for an indigent civil party in the same
case. 40
After the president has questioned the accused and the prosecuting
attorney has presented the accusation, counsel for the partie civil
frequently rises41 and presents a much more relentless attack. Thus,
even if the state should decide to pursue a softer line, his active par-
ticipation in the trial is a constant reminder to the court that the case
involves more than the accused and the faceless general public. 2
37 See, for instance, Code de Procidure PNnale de Vaud, arts. 48-55.
38 The basic requirement is that, lacking counsel, a person could not properly safe-
guard his interests. K. contre Thurgovien, 9 mai 1941, Arriss du Tribunal F~dral, 67, I.
65. Thus no lawyer is provided if the case is an easy one or if it is thought that the
prosecuting attorney will protect these interests.
39 The Court has not ruled on this point. But it has said that even if the civil
party in a criminal case has a lawyer this does not give an indigent defendant the con-
stitutional right to have counsel appointed for him. Supra notes 19 and 38. This seems to
be stacking the cards too much against the accused. There is, of course, such a right in
all serious cases, and probably in minor offenses if because of his inexperience or his
youth, an accused cannot properly defend himself. Supra note 7. Cf. supra note 19.
40 Supra note 25. art. 10. Art. 213 of the Procdure F~ddrale says simply that a
lawyer can be appointed for the injured party in a penal case. Much depends upon how
complicated the civil aspects may be.
41 Code de Procldure PNnale de Gen~ve, art. 308: "The civil party or his counsel
... speak next and develop points which support the accusation."
42 In a federal criminal case, the injured party has the right to question witnesses
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Such provisions underscore the fact that the Swiss do not de-
nigrate the just claims of the innocent victim by excessive zeal in
protecting the criminal. If procedural rights of the latter have really
been infringed, Swiss law has ways for calling the responsible official
to task and for providing condign satisfaction.43 But this is not done
by indirectly punishing the innocent victim by letting the guilty go
free!
To the Swiss it seems like a weird type of justice where the judge
extinguishes the victim's claim by tearing up a perfectly valid con-
fession44 or by discarding a most convincing piece of evidence merely
because the official who obtained them neglected to follow a legal
technicality.4
5
CONCLUSION
What conclusions may be drawn from the matter presented above?
It is obvious, first of all, that in Swiss law the suspect and the accused
are by no means as privileged as in American law in the matter of
state-appointed counsel. Many Swiss lawyers and professors of law
and experts, and after all evidence has been presented, he makes his own summation
following that of the prosecuting attorney. Procedure F~d6rale, arts 159, 167. A similar
practice prevails in the cantons. See, e.g., Code de Proc6dure du Valais, art. 136. Note
that art. 167 of the Proc&dure Fdrale permits the prosecuting attorney to represent the
injured party in the summation only if the latter agrees.
48 Switzerland has a highly developed sense of the responsibility of the state for
the official acts of its functionaries. It freely allows itself to be sued by parties injured
through their negligence or by their illegal acts. This is true even of judges who cause
harm to a person by a decision rising from grossly careless legal work. See, e.g., Loi sur
la responsibilit6 de l'Etat du Canton de Vaud (16 mal 1961); Clerc, "La Responsabilit6
de l'Etat en Mati&re Pinae," 75 Revue P~nae Suisse 366 (1959); Specziali contre Etat
de Gen~ve, Arr~ts du Tribunal F6d6ral, (22 d6c. 1953), 79, I, 424. Here, the court, in
granting 20,000 francs in damages against Geneva, said that "the responsibility of the
state is involved by the faults committed by magistrates on the judicial plane." (at
439). The state must repair the damage if the fault was serious and one "which an
ordinary judge, serious in his work, would not have committed." (at 439).
44 A confession can not be used in an American court if it came during police
questioning of an accused who was not previously advised that he had a right to consult
a lawyer. Sapra note 1.
45 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 463 (1961). Switzerland also forbids searches without
warrants and it has carefully drawn laws governing proper respect for persons and
homes during the search. But it would not discard valid evidence even if obtained in
violation of these procedures. To prevent violations, the State, in addition to means
mentioned above in note 43, provides for the discipline and even the dismissal from
service of the offending functionary. Moreover, after the state has paid damages, it
can sue the guilty officer, if his action has been the product of grave negligence. Loi sur
la responsabilit6 de 1'Etat du Canton de Vaud (16 mai 1961), arts. 9, 10; Loi sur le
statut g&uiral des fonctions publiques cantonales (9 juin 1947), arts. 30-45. Other cantons
have similar laws.
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freely admit their dissatisfaction with this aspect of criminal pro-
cedure. On the other hand all are quite astonished at the extent of the
right in the United States as a result of recent decisions of the Supreme
Court. They would not like to see such a practice established in Swit-
zerland. As mentioned above, in a Swiss criminal case, the injured
person usually joins as the civil party and sues for damages, recovery
of property, redress for bodily harm, etc. Thus the Swiss are not likely
to lose sight of the victim. Consequently they are little inclined to let
a guilty man go free because of technicalities when that would strip
the innocent party of all means of restitution.
Perhaps one should conclude that the Swiss are negligent in not
providing counsel in all criminal cases and in not permitting suspects
freely to consult lawyers at every period of the interrogation. But in
civil cases Swiss law seems far more advanced than American law. The
"equality" clause in the Swiss Constitution has been interpreted by
the Court to demand state appointed lawyers in civil cases, but not
necessarily in criminal cases. (As mentioned above, actual practice is
far more generous than the tribunal's demands). The Swiss Court
seems sound in its reasoning: in a criminal case the accused is auto-
matically guaranteed a hearing by the Court procedure itself,46 but
in civil cases everything depends upon the parties themselves. Here
the procedure is frequently so complicated that a lawyer is almost
essential even to take the preliminary steps.
Moreover, the very practical Swiss realize that the greatest sub-
stantive injustices are those committed in civil cases. Percentage-wise,
the number of persons punished for crimes they did not commit is
infinitesimal. The real tragedy is seen in divorce, paternity, property,
and personal injury cases. If a plaintiff has a legitimate grievance, the
46 Perhaps this is much truer in Switzerland than in America because of the active
part taken by the Swiss judge. On this point, see supra notes 19-25 and accompanying
text. For a general treatment of the procedure in French-speaking Switzerland, see Clerc,
Le Procis Penal en Suisse Romande (1955).
It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court of Switzerland very rarely imposes
any obligation on the cantons in the matter of penal procedure even though there is only
one criminal code dealing with substantive matters for the whole country applicable
everywhere. On the possibility of the adoption of one single procedure, see Clerc,
'%'Avenir de la Procedure P nale," Regards sur le droit Suisse (1962). "
There is no "due process" clause in the Swiss constitutions and thus the Swiss Court
is denied a handy legal formula which the United States Supreme Court has effectively
used for establishing some general procedures in America. In the instances where the
Court in Switzerland has intervened, it has employed the "equality before the law"
clause found in article four of the Constitution. Its decisions frequently read like "due
process" rulings. See Darbellay, "Le droit d'6tre entendu," 83 Zeitschrift fur Schweiz
Recht 419-584 (1964).
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Swiss think it unfair that the judicial portals must remain locked for
him simply because he has no legal craftsman competent to open them.
As for the innocent defendant, Swiss law would consider it an outrage
that he must stand naked before its tribunals to be humiliated and
destroyed by a vindictive plaintiff and his crafty attorney.
The Supreme Court of the United States is disquieted that accused
persons, no matter how guilty, should be unable to enjoy all their
legal rights merely for lack of money. The Swiss are disturbed that
innocent persons might have to forgo theirs for the same reason. To
prevent such untoward happenings, Swiss law provides indigents with
lawyers in all civil cases."
47 That is in all cases not doomed to failure for want of any reasonable grounds.
Supra notes 26-28.
